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supervenience, epistemic. The thesis that, necessarily, whenev-
er something has an epistemic property, E, it has a collection of 
non-epistemic properties, possession of which entails that it has E. 
Epistemic properties include justification, rationality, reasonable-
ness, warrant, and knowledge. Non-epistemic properties include 
truth, falsity, reliably produced, and psychologically certain. Epis-
temologists tend to agree that an acceptable epistemological theory 
must respect the supervenience of epistemic on non-epistemic 
properties.
The supervenience thesis can be understood ontologically, in 
which case it pertains to properties (or truths or facts), or linguisti-
cally, in which case it applies to ascriptions. Those inclined to anti-
realism about epistemic properties will favor the latter (Klagge 
1988). Epistemologists, generally disinclined to anti-realism about 
epistemic properties, focus on the former.
Supervenience is a relation between classes of properties (or 
truths, or facts). The A-properties supervene on the B-properties 
(the “subvenient” or “base” properties) just in case no two things 
can differ in their A-properties without also differing in some of 
their B-properties. In short:
(S) There cannot be an A-difference without a B-differ-
ence.
Supervenience theses vary with respect to what they quantify 
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over. Individual supervenience theses quantify over individuals, re-
gional over regions of space-time, and global over entire possible 
worlds. Alternative versions of the thesis also result from different 
interpretations of the modal force of ‘cannot’ (nomological, meta-
physical, analytic, or logical). A further issue concerns the possible 
distribution patterns of A- and B-properties. Weak supervenience 
theses restrict patterns only within respective possible worlds (in-
tra-world restriction), whereas strong ones restrict them across 
possible worlds (inter-world restriction). In epistemology, superve-
nience theses are typically, if not always, individual, strong, and 
stated in terms of metaphysical necessity.
The supervenience of the A-properties on the B-properties does 
not guarantee that the A-properties “depend on” or otherwise ob-
tain “because of” or “in virtue of” the B-properties. Further argu-
ment is needed to establish these more robust metaphysical claims 
(Grimes 1988; Kim 2002: xviii – xxii). For example, the singleton 
set whose only member is the property of being self-identical super-
venes on the set of color properties, but things are not self-identical 
because of their color properties.
Epistemic supervenience is the view that,
(ES)  Necessarily,  whenever  something  has  an  epis-
temic property, E, it has a collection of non-epis-
temic properties,  N, possession of which entails 
that it has E (Van Cleve 1985, pp. 97 – 98; Sosa 
1991, pp. 156, 183).
While ES covers all epistemic properties of all possible doxastic atti-
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tudes and cognizers, for simplicity we focus on the justification of 
beliefs. The relevant modality is metaphysical. N might include 
complex relational properties. Technically, ES is neutral on whether 
there are any epistemic properties.
Statements of the thesis vary, most conspicuously in that some-
times instead of “non-epistemic” properties, E is said to supervene 
on “non-normative” or “non-evaluative” or “natural” or “descrip-
tive” properties (compare Goldman 1979, p. 340, Chisholm 1989, 
pp. 42f, and Sosa 1991, p. 153). Sometimes an author will use two or 
more of these interchangeably (e.g., Steup 1996, pp. 30 – 43; Lehrer 
1997, pp. 64 – 65), but the differences among them are potentially 
significant. Consider divine command epistemology, according to 
which it is a necessary truth that a belief is justified if and only if 
God commands the subject to hold it. Having been commanded by 
God is neither an epistemic nor an evaluative property, so divine 
command epistemology entails ES, as well as the version of ES with 
‘non-evaluative’ substituted for ‘non-epistemic’. But it is not a natu-
ral property in any recognizable sense of ‘natural’, so divine com-
mand epistemology does not entail the version of ES with ‘natural’ 
substituted for ‘non-epistemic’.
To deny ES is to claim that at least some epistemic properties 
are autonomous (Sosa 1991, pp. 153 – 154) or independent of the 
non-epistemic (Lehrer 1997, p. 64). One could consistently deny the 
possibility of a satisfactory analysis of any epistemic concept in 
completely non-epistemic terms, yet at the same time endorse ES. 
Ernest Sosa (1991, pp. 153 – 154) calls this combination of views 
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pessimism. 
Proponents of ES need not deny that epistemic properties also 
supervene on epistemic properties. Indeed, it would be foolish to 
deny this further claim, since every set of properties trivially super-
venes on itself.
A standard argument in favor of ES proceeds from the observa-
tion that the evaluative in general supervenes on the non-evaluative 
(Alston 1976, p. 170; Kim 1988, p. 310; Sosa 1991, pp. 152, 179, 192):
1. All evaluative properties supervene on non-evaluative 
properties. 
2. All epistemic properties are evaluative properties.
3. Therefore, all epistemic properties supervene on non-eval-
uative properties.
The conclusion of this argument is stronger than the official state-
ment of ES; it entails ES, but ES does not in turn entail it. Unlike 
the conclusion of the present argument, ES would not be falsified if 
it turned out that epistemic properties supervene on non-epistemi-
cally evaluative properties (e.g., moral properties) that do not in 
turn supervene on non-evaluative ones.
James Van Cleve (1985, pp. 98 – 99) offers the following argu-
ment in favor of epistemic supervenience (substituting “non-epis-
temic” for “natural”).
1. Either the epistemic supervenes on the non-epistemic, or 
there could be a justified belief with no non-epistemic 
properties, or there could be a justified belief with some 
non-epistemic properties but none that entails its epis-
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temic properties.
2. There could not be a justified belief with no non-epistemic 
properties.
3. There could not be a justified belief with some non-epis-
temic properties but none that entails its epistemic proper-
ties.
4. Therefore, the epistemic supervenes on the non-epistemic.
Premise 2 is true because any belief will have some non-epistemic 
property, e.g., temporal properties. Denying premise 3 would be 
“absurd” because that would imply “that there could be another be-
lief just like [a paradigmatically justified belief] in all [non-epis-
temic] respects—directed at the same proposition, caused by similar 
causes, accompanied by similar experiences, related in the same 
ways to other beliefs of its subject, and so on—yet not justified.” Yet 
“a difference in epistemic status must surely be traceable to some 
further [non-epistemic] difference.” It is unclear how persuasive 
this defense of premise 3 would be to someone who didn’t already 
share the intuition that ES is true.
Keith Lehrer is the chief opponent of epistemic supervenience, 
and has offered several arguments against the view. At times Lehrer 
suggests (1997, p. 70; 1999, p. 1071) that ES fails because we cannot 
give an account of epistemic properties “without the use of epis-
temic terms.” But this confuses pessimism with the autonomy of 
epistemic properties (Sosa 2003, p. 27f). However, Lehrer’s argu-
ments discussed hereafter do not trade on this confusion.
One of Lehrer’s arguments proceeds from the supposed failure 
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of alethic supervenience (Lehrer 1997, pp. 68f and 73 – 75), along 
with an element of Lehrer’s positive theory of justification, to wit, 
that (undefeated) justification requires that the subject have true 
beliefs about what she is trustworthy in accepting. Justification 
won’t supervene on natural properties unless truth does, then, be-
cause a necessary condition for justification is that the subject have 
true beliefs about her trustworthiness. However, this fails to ac-
knowledge the possibility that the set of truths about what subjects 
are trustworthy in accepting could supervene on the subjects’ natu-
ral properties even if truths in general do not. But Lehrer does deny 
that truths about trustworthiness supervene on natural or even 
non-epistemic properties: “There is nothing about me, short of my 
being trustworthy in what I accept, that necessitates that I am trust-
worthy in what I accept” (1997, p. 72). Since trustworthiness itself is 
said to be an epistemic property, this would falsify ES. In response, 
Van Cleve (1999, pp. 1054f) remarks that if Lehrer is correct, then it 
is possible for a trustworthy person to “cease being trustworthy” 
even though nothing about her or her environment changed in non-
epistemic respects. According to Van Cleve, however, it is extremely 
counterintuitive that trustworthiness could “float free in that way ... 
fluctuating though nothing else fluctuates with it….”
Another of Lehrer’s  arguments (1999, pp. 1070; 2003, p. 318) 
begins with the claim that metaphysical necessity and possibility 
“track consistency”: “If the claim that x exemplifies F and not G is 
consistent, then it is possible that x exemplifies F and not G, and it 
is not necessarily true that if x exemplifies F, then x exemplifies G” 
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(2003, 318). Let ‘F’ predicate any non-epistemic property, or com-
bination thereof, that the supervenience theorist proposes, and ‘G’ 
the property justifiedly believes that he has hands. The claim that S 
is F and not G is consistent. So it is metaphysically possible that S is 
F and not G. Therefore, ES is false. For the argument to succeed, we 
need a suitable characterization of consistency. If consistency just 
means logical consistency, then consistency does not imply meta-
physical possibility: it is logically consistent to say that water is a 
chemical element, or that I am petting an orca but not a mammal, 
but neither of these things is metaphysically possible. If consistency 
means metaphysical possibility, then the argument begs the ques-
tion.
Lehrer (2003, p. 320) also offers this argument:
1. If epistemic properties supervene on natural properties, 
then epistemic properties are epiphenomenal.
2. Epistemic properties are not epiphenomenal.
3. Therefore, epistemic properties do not supervene on natu-
ral properties.
To say epistemic properties are epiphenomenal is to say that they 
are causally inefficacious, mere “causal danglers.” A similar argu-
ment, which Lehrer also embraces, applies to moral properties. 
Premise 1 is the weak link. From the fact that a property supervenes 
on natural properties, we cannot conclude that it is epiphenomenal. 
Paradigmatically causally efficacious properties, such as having a 
force of 150 newtons, supervene on natural properties, since they 
are natural properties.
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Earl Conee and Richard Feldman advocate “mentalism,” the 
view that justification “strongly supervenes” on the subject’s total 
mental condition, which entails that “if any two possible individuals 
are exactly alike mentally, then they are alike justificationally, e.g., 
the same beliefs are justified for them to the same extent” (2001, p. 
56). They argue for mentalism on the grounds that it best explains 
our intuitions about a wide range of particular cases. They also 
maintain that mentalism is the only or best way to defend a broadly 
internalist perspective on justification, given that standard argu-
ments based on a deontological conception of justification have 
been undermined.
Mentalism pertains solely to justification. It does not state, for 
instance, that knowledge or warrant supervenes on the mental. ES 
could be true even if mentalism were false, and vice versa. Epis-
temic properties might supervene on non-epistemic properties, e.g., 
contingent reliability relations, despite failing to supervene on the 
mental, in which case ES would be true and mentalism false. Men-
talism would be true and ES false if some of justification’s subve-
nient mental properties were epistemic properties that did not in 
turn supervene on non-epistemic properties. And even if knowledge 
failed to supervene on non-epistemic properties, justification might 
still supervene on non-epistemic mental properties, in which case 
mentalism would be true and ES false.
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